
2 June 1982

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H. Rowen concluded this A.M.'s NIC discussion of the draft of NIE 4-82 (see NIO comments, attached) with a charge to the regional NIOs that they furnish written comments to us by <u>8 June</u> on any relevant domestic political, or other, factors they would propose be included as germaine. Meantime, is adding some material drawing on certain written comments provided by Messrs.  I think we're still on track.	25X 25X
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25X1

Decisive factor in proliferation is a country's sense of security; the US can take measures to affect this, notable examples being Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Israel.

Need to do more on prospects for various kinds of international cooperation efforts. Concept of security as a motivation should be mentioned as a general proposition.

A nuclear capability buys you troubles. A second, more speculative, paper should be done that gets at this and other questions.

Paper carries implicit assumption that every country wants a bomb; paper should underscore disincentives for having a bomb.

Need to look at domestic political factors in India, Taiwan, and South Korea for the real clues to motivation for a bomb. That clearly was the story for India's explosion. Many DDI analysts salivating to contribute to this aspect of the problem.

Rhetorical question: Why are various countries moving at less than their overall capacity to produce weapons? Ans. - there are important domestic restraints and this is a general proposition that should be included.

There is considerable urgency in Latin America, particularly the Argentine danger. There should be a discussion of alternative approaches to stopping proliferation, e.g., US incentives to break up the German connections.

Could expand the consideration of the psychological effect of South African nuclear weapons on the rest of the continent.